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APPLICATION OF THE "EXCLUSIONARY
RULE" TO BAR USE OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,' the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations committed by school officials.2
Ultimately, the Court's opinion did not address this question because
the Court found the search at issue was constitutional. The Court
expressly noted that its "determination that the search at issue in this
case did not violate the Fourth Amendment implies no particular
resolution of the question of the applicability of the exclusionary
rule."'3 In Thompson v. Carthage School District,4 the Eighth Circuit
resolved the exclusionary rule issue left open in T.L.O.
1. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
2. The exclusionary rule issue was the basis of the Supreme Court's interest in the T.L.O.
case. See id. at 327 (stating that the Court granted certiorari "to examine the appropriateness of
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment
by public school authorities").
3. Id. at 333 n.3 ("[We do not implicitly determine that the exclusionary rule applies to
the fruits of unlawful searches conducted by school authorities.").
For a discussion of the shortcomings of T.L.O., including its failure to discuss the
exclusionary rule, see Brenda Jones Waits, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Questions the Court Did
Not Answer About School Searches, 14 J.L. & EDUC. 421 (1985).
4. 87 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 1996).
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The exclusionary rule provides that where the government has
obtained evidence illegally,' the unconstitutionally acquired evidence
cannot be used at the trial against the defendant whose rights the
government has violated.6 The Constitution does not mandate the
exclusionary rule.7 The exclusionary rule was judicially created by
the Supreme Court in 1914.8 Since its creation, the announced
justification underlying the exclusionary rule has evolved from a
"principled" rationale based on a theory of limited governmental
powers,9  to a "deterrence" rationale based on pragmatic
considerations.' Whatever the justification for the exclusionary rule,
its effect is to exclude evidence obtained by the government in
violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. Although the rule
5. In Thompson, the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. There
are other types of exclusionary rules. For example, evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth or
Sixth Amendments may also be excluded from criminal trials. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (Sixth
Amendment).
6. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 564 (6th ed. 1990) ("Under this rule evidence which is
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure is excluded from admissibility under the Fourth
Amendment....').
7. Like most other provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment does not spell
out the consequences if the right that it announces is violated. Unlike the Fifth Amendment,
which by its own terms renders evidence falling within its prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination inadmissible in criminal cases, the Fourth Amendment does not expressly
preclude the admission of evidence obtained in an unreasonable search and seizure. See Bernard
A. Nigro, Jr., Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Proceedings, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 564,564 (1986).
8. The Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914). Prior to the creation of the exclusionary rule in Weeks, the fact that evidence had
been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was considered a "collateral matter" that
did not affect the admissibility of the evidence. See, e.g., Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585
(1904). Currently, the Court supports a two-part analysis to determine admissibility. See T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 333 n.3 ("The question whether evidence should be excluded from a criminal
proceeding involves two discrete inquiries: whether the evidence was seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and whether the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for the
violation.").
9. The "principled basis" for the exclusionary rule, relied on by the Court in Weeks, is
primarily based on the concept of limited governmental powers. See infra Part III.A for a
discussion of the "principled basis."
10. The "deterrence rationale" for the exclusionary rule, relied on by the Court in recent
cases, is based on practical and pragmatic considerations rather than a specific view of
govemmental or judicial roles. See infra Part 1U.B for a discussion of the deterrence rationale
for the exclusionary rule.
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vindicates the defendant's rights, it often allows a demonstrably
guilty individual to escape punishment."
Thus, since its introduction, federal courts have continually cut
back at the exclusionary principle's scope, and have created many
exceptions to the rule.'2 This process of limitation reflects the
fundamental redefinition of the character and purpose of the rule, a
redefinition that can be traced to the changes in the announced
justification of the rule. A recent decision of the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals'3 rejecting the application of the exclusionary rule in
school disciplinary hearings 4 is an example of the redefinition of the
purpose and application of the exclusionary rule.
This Recent Development analyzes the Thompson decision and its
effect on future civil disciplinary school proceedings. Part I discusses
the history and development of the exclusionary rule. Part II explains
the different and evolving justifications for the exclusionary rule. Part
III describes how the exclusionary rule had gradually weakened as a
result of a number of Supreme Court decisions. Finally, Part IV
analyzes the Thompson decision.
11. This is one of the biggest problems with using the exclusionary rule as a remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations. "There are those who say, as did Justice (then Judge) Cardozo,
that under our constitutional exclusionary doctrine 'the criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered."' Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (quoting People v. Defore,
150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926)). Although instances in which a criminal defendant "gets off on
a technicality" elicit headlines and public outcry, such instances appear to be very infrequent.
For Instance, Thomas Y. Davies has pointed out that the rule is less "costly" in this regard than
it is often assumed. His authoritative 1983 study estimated that less than 2.35% of all felony
arrests are "lost" at any stage in the arrest disposition process because of the rule's operation.
See Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the
"Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 611 (1983), cited in
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984).
12. The Supreme Court has itself upheld the admission of such evidence for other
purposes. For example, illegally seized evidence may be admissible at trial to impeach a
defendant's testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Federal courts have also devised a number of exceptions to the
application of the exclusionary rule, including the "good faith exception" to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 879 (1984).
13. Thompson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 1996). See infra Part V for a
discussion of the Thompson case.
14. The court expressed its holding negatively: "[W]e conclude that the exclusionary rule
may not be applied to prevent school officials from disciplining students based upon the fruits
of a search conducted on school grounds." Thompson, 87 F.3d at 982.
1997]
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I. HISTORY AND INCORPORATION OF EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Judicial Origin of the Exclusionary Rule
The Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule in Weeks v.
United States.5 Weeks was a defendant in a federal prosecution in
which the Supreme Court prevented the government from using
documents that were seized in a warrantless, unconstitutional search
of Weeks' home.' 6 The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that
the search was "in direct violation of the constitutional rights of the
defendant" and thus, the trial court's decision to allow the documents
to be used in the defendant's trial was "a denial of the constitutional
rights of the accused."' 7 Reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court
explained that a trial court could not admit evidence which was
seized unconstitutionally.
8
B. Application to States Through the Fourteenth Amendment
When the Court decided Weeks, the Bill of Rights functioned
mainly to limit the powers of the federal government, not the states.' 9
In fact, the Weeks decision explicitly stated that its rules did not apply
to searches conducted by state officials.2" Like most of the terms of
15. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
16. Weeks was employed by an express company at the Union Station in Kansas City,
Missouri. State police officers and a United States Marshal arrested and searched him without a
warrant, and Weeks was convicted of "[using] the mails for the purpose of transporting certain
coupons or tickets representing chances or shares in a lottery or gift enterprise, in violation of §
213 of the Criminal Code." Id. at 386.
17. Id. at 398. The issue ofwhether the search violated the Fourth Amendment is separate,
in theory, from the issue of what remedy is owed to the victim of the violation. See supra note
8. The Weeks Court applied the exclusionary rule to remedy such violations.
18. The novelty of the Weeks decision is that the Court stated the rule positively: "[Tihe
[trial] court should have restored these letters to the accused. In holding them and permitting
their use upon the trial, we think prejudicial error was committed." Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
19. Most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, which is by its own terms applicable only
to the federal government, have since been made applicable to the states through the view that
they are "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule.
20. Two statements in the decision limit the Fourth Amendment to the federal government
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol52/iss1/21
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the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizures-and the exclusionary rule-have
since been held to be applicable to the states.2' The Supreme Court's
decision in Mapp v. Ohio22 finalized the incorporation of Fourth
Amendment protections into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by extending the exclusionary rule to
prosecutions in state courts.23 Fourth Amendment violations by state
officials are now a common source of constitutional litigation.
Although the Court originally held in Weeks that the exclusionary
rule applied only to unconstitutional searches conducted by federal
actors, today many of the cases involving the application of the
exclusionary rule involve state actors, such as the school officials
whose conduct was at issue in Thompson.
and its officers. First, the Court stated that "[a]s to the papers and property seized by the [state]
policemen, it does not appear that they acted under any claim of Federal authority such as
would make the Amendment applicable to such unauthorized seizures." Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
Later the court reiterated the limitations of the Fourth Amendment, stating that "[w]hat
remedies the defendant may have against them we need not inquire, as the Fourth Amendment
is not directed to individual misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reach the Federal
Government and its agencies." Id.
21, See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp the Court held that "all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court." Id. at 655.
22. Dolly Mapp was "convicted of knowingly having had in her possession ... certain
lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs in violation of § 2905.34 of Ohio's
Revised Code." Id. at 643. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld her conviction, despite the fact that
the conviction was "based primarily upon the introduction in evidence of [material] . . .
unlawfully seized during an unlawful search of defendant's home." Id. at 643.
23. The dictates of the Fourth Amendment itself had been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment (and thus applied to the states) since Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
However, the Wolf decision did not incorporate the exclusionary rule; rather, the Wof Court
expressly stated "that in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth
Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and
seizure." Id. at 33. Mapp overturned Wolf in this respect. "Since the Fourth Amendment's right
of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion used against the
Federal Government." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
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II. EVOLVING JUSTIFICATION FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. "Principled" Basis for the Exclusionary Rule
Although the Weeks decision created the exclusionary rule, it shed
little light on the rationale for the rule. Instead, the Supreme Court's
opinion covered the history and basis of the Fourth Amendment, with
little express rationale for the exclusionary rule as a separate
consideration.24 Some have suggested that the exclusionary rule is
best viewed as a product of the constitutional concept of limited
governmental power.
The Weeks Court reasoned that an unconstitutional search was
beyond the proper sphere of power of the government, including all
of its branches.26 If the government had no authority under the
Constitution to seize the evidence, a government prosecutor could not
rely on the evidence in a criminal trial, and a court could not admit
24. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 389-92 (discussing early cases including Bran v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1987); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Exparte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727 (1877)). The Weeks Court considered the basis of the Fourth Amendment to be the
maxim that "a man's house was his castle and not to be invaded by any general authority," a
maxim which was "made a part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures." Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390. This rationale applies directly to the Fourth
Amendment, and not to the exclusionary rule as a remedy.
25. The "limited governmental power" rationale receives support from the Weeks decision
is use of language and from its reliance on the explicit dictates of the Constitution. The Weeks
Court stated that "the Fourth Amendment... put the courts of the United States and Federal
officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints .... .
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-92. The Court also stated that the U.S. Marshal's actions were outside
of his authority and without sanction of law, and that "without sworn information and particular
description, not even an order of court would have justified such procedure." Id. at 393-94,
Thus, the Court considered the acts beyond the government's powers.
26. The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment is meaningless without the
exclusionary rule, arguing that
[i]f letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches
and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.
Id. at 393.
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the evidence for use at a trial.27 This analysis of the need for the
exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence is known as the
"principled" basis of the exclusionary rule.
However, the Supreme Court clouded the theoretical rationale for
the exclusionary rule in later decisions such as Mapp.2  Writing for
the Court in Mapp, Justice Clark largely paralleled the principled
rationale offered for the rule in Weeks.29 However, his opinion also
offered pragmatic reasons for extending the Weeks rule to the states,
thereby weakening the "principled" basis.3" A rule required for
pragmatic reasons is less powerful than a rule required by the
constitutional limits on the government's power.
But the bigger blow to the "principled" rationale was Justice
Black's opinion. Although Justice Clark's opinion in Mapp
represented a five-justice majority in favor of applying the
exclusionary rule to the states, it represented the views of only a four-
justice plurality regarding the basis of the exclusionary rule itself.3 '
Justice Black cast the deciding vote, applying the exclusionary rule to
the states, but concluding that the rule was required only by the
27. The Court stated that "to sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution,
intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action." Weeks, 232 U.S. at
394.
28. Mapp incorporated the exclusionary rule into the Fourteenth Amendment as the
remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment, the substantive protections of which had been
previously incorporated in Wolf See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
29. Clark described the rule as being required by the Fourth Amendment and stressed that
without the rule the Fourth Amendment would be reduced, in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes'
words, "to a form of words." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (quoting Silverthome Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)); cf Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393 (stating that without the
exclusionary rule, "[t]he protection of the Fourth Amendment... might as well be stricken
from the Constitution").
30. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pragmatic reasons
which appear in Clark's decision.
3 . Mapp was a relatively splintered opinion. Most of the dissenters disagreed with the
concept of incorporation. Thus, their opposition to incorporating the exclusionary rule had little
to do with the rule's merits. However, Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion stated that he "would
not impose upon the States this federal exclusionary remedy. The reasons given by the majority
for now suddenly turning its back on Wolfseem to me notably unconvincing." Mapp, 367 U.S.
at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart wrote a separate "memorandum" in which he
"express[ed] no view as to the merits of the constitutional issue [facing] the Court [in Mapp]."
Id. at 672 (Memorandum of Stewart, J.).
19971
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Fourth and Fifth Amendments in combination.32 His unique and
narrow view of the exclusionary rule meant that the "principled"
basis of the rule failed to command a majority of the court, thus
opening the door to other less compelling rationales.
B. "Deterrence" Rationale for the Exclusionary Rule
Although Justice Clark's opinion in Mapp largely followed the
principled basis for the rule, analysis of the opinion shows that
another rationale was also on his mind.3 For example, at one point
his opinion referred to the rule as a "deterrent safeguard."34 Justice
Clark also stated that pragmatic policy considerations favored
applying the rule to the states, given the fact that states without
exclusionary rules had not developed any effective alternative means
of dealing with unreasonable police searches.3" This concern for
32. Justice Black argued that the exclusionary rule was not required by the Fourth
Amendment standing alone, "[flor the Fourth Amendment does not itself contain any provision
expressly precluding the use of such evidence .... " Id. at 661-62 (Black, J., concurring).
Justice Black considered the Fourth Amendment's lack of language barring admissibility to be
crucial. See supra note 7. However, he stated that "when the Fourth Amendment's ban against
unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but
actually requires the exclusionary rule." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 662.
33. Justice Clark's opinion grounded the exclusionary rule in the Constitution, but he also
recognized that the principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal trials
had not been restricted solely to constitutional ones. In particular, Justice Clark dealt with
"factual considerations" which had led the Woef Court to conclude that the exclusionary rule
should not extend to the states. He did so only reluctantly: "While they are not basically
relevant to a decision that the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of the Fourth
Amendment... we will consider the current validity of the factual grounds upon which Wolf is
based." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651.
34. Id. at 648.
35. The Court placed great emphasis on "the experience of California that such other
remedies have been worthless and futile[, which was] buttressed by the experience of other
states." Id. at 652. The Mapp court noted that many states were forced to adopt the exclusionary
rule. California, for example, "according to its highest court, was 'compelled to reach that
conclusion because other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the
constitutional provisions .... .' Id. at 651 (quoting People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955)),
The Mapp Court rejected the alternative of not applying the exclusionary rule to
unreasonable searches and seizures by state officials, because to do so would create a double
standard for the Fourth Amendment and render it "valueless." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. The
search for alternatives to the exclusionary rule to serve as remedies for Fourth Amendment
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol52/iss1/21
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pragmatism was meant to strengthen the exclusionary rule, as was
Justice Clark's appeal that the exclusionary rule was appropriate
because there were no other satisfactory alternatives. However, these
arguments undercut the principled basis of the rule and its reliance on
a view of limited government powers. Critics pointed out that the rule
was not required by the Constitution, but was only a judge-made,
instrumental policy aimed at deterring future police misconduct.36
After the Mapp decision, the exclusionary rule applied to state
criminal cases and defendants.37 The Mapp decision flushed the
practical effects of the exclusionary rule out in the open, making
them a target for criticism and testing.38 Because the effect of the rule
is usually to let a demonstrably guilty individual go free,39 some
critics claimed that the rule unfairly rewarded the guilty and punished
police and prosecutors. In fact, many stated that the exclusionary rule
was "handcuffing the police." Testing the actual effects of the rule,
violations has proved fruitless. See infra note 43 (discussing the search for alternatives).
36. This argument, while genuine, was a tactical decision. By divorcing the rule from its
'pnncipled" basis, this argument made the exclusionary rule less sacrosanct and more open to
further criticism on its practical merits. If the rule was in fact constitutionally required, it would
be difficult to either repeal or amend. If, however, the exclusionary rule was "only" a judge-
made policy to deter unconstitutional searches, it could be more easily replaced.
37. Criminal law has traditionally been a concern for the individual states. Prior to the
incorporation of the exclusionary rule, its application was limited to those few federal crimes of
the early part of the century, such as tax evasion and certain other "white collar" crimes. The
application of the exclusionary rule to the much more varied and visible world of state criminal
defendants probably helped to force the issue to the forefront of academics and practice.
38. A number ofjudges and scholars have questioned the extent to which the exclusionary
rule actually serves to deter unconstitutional searches. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 US. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Many empirical studies have been
conducted that show little deterrent effect. See, e.g.. Dallin H Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970) (concluding that the exclusionary
rule has no deterrent effect).
An endless cycle has emerged regarding criticism of the rule as a deterrent device,
empirical testing of the rule's deterrent effects, and criticism of the testing as flawed. See United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1976) (stating that "although scholars have attempted to
determine whether the exclusionary rule in fact does have any deterrent effect, each empirical
study on the subject, in its own way, appears to be flawed").
39. See supra note II and accompanying text.
40. The phrase itself is of uncertain origin, but endures because of the paradoxical
imagery it evokes. The Mapp Court did not use the language, but addressed this argument when
it stated that "[n]or can it lightly be assumed that, as a practical matter, adoption of the
exclusionary rule fetters law enforcement." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
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however, proved far more difficult. Leading academics debated the
effect of the rule. Proponents of the Mapp decision argued that
"handcuffing the police" was a positive result because the rule forced
police departments to train officers about the constitutional limits on
searches.4 ' In response critics argued that the rule in fact had no effect
on the searches and behavior of police officers because the rule did
not directly punish offending officers.42 Thus, the focus of the
academics' arguments was on the more pragmatic, deterrence
rationale for the exclusionary rule. The rule's critics, in effect, argued
that because the rule was a poor deterrent for police officers, it should
be abandoned when another remedy for unconstitutional searches is
found.43
III. WEAKENING OF THE RULE: THE CALANDRA DECISION
A. Adoption of the Deterrence Rationale and Framework
In United States v. Calandra,4 the Supreme Court followed the
shift in the academics' emphasis from principled arguments to
deterrence arguments. In Calandra, the Court stated that the
exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence offered in grand jury
proceedings, holding that evidence is admissible before a grand jury
even if it is obtained in an illegal unconstitutional search.45 In terms
41. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a
"Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565
(1983). Many empirical tests have in fact failed to resolve the issue. See supra note 38. See also
Janis, 428 U.S. at 450 n.22.
42. See, e.g., Oaks, supra note 38, at 756-57.
43. The search for alternative remedies for violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition
has proven as difficult and futile as the search for empirical evidence of the deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule. A ten year experiment in the states, conducted by the Supreme Court
between the Wolf and Mapp decisions, failed to produce any acceptable alternative remedies.
See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. The search for a better remedy continues.
"[A]ltematives that would be less costly to societal interests have been the subject of extensive
discussion and exploration." Janis, 428 U.S. at 449. The Janis Court listed a number of
proposals, but did not announce any viable replacement for the rule. See id. at 450-52 n.22.
44. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
45. See id. at 342. Federal agents searched Calandra's place of business under a warrant
specifying that the object of the search was to discover and seize bookmaking records and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol52/iss1/21
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of broader implication, the Calandra ruling replaced the principled
basis of the rule with the deterrence rationale.46
The Calandra decision represented a sharp break with the "limited
governmental powers" view of the earliest exclusionary rule
decisions. The Court allowed the grand jury to see the evidence even
though the search was beyond the constitutional authority of the
officers conducting the search. Calandra expressly rejected the
argument that the rule was part of the Fourth Amendment right
against search and seizure, and adopted a deterrence rationale, stating
the "rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police
conduct."'47
Most importantly, the Calandra opinion announced a framework
for determining whether the exclusionary rule should or should not
be applied to a given situation." Because the Court adopted a
deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule, it held that the question
wagering paraphernalia. See id. at 340. One of the agents discovered and seized a suspected
record of "loansharking." Id. at 340-41. A grand jury subpoenaed Calandra to question him
about the seized evidence, but he refused to testify. See id. at 341. The District Court granted a
motion to suppress, on the grounds that the search unconstitutionally exceeded the scope of the
warrant. See id. at 341-42. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule did
not apply to bar the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings.
See id. at 342. Note the distinction between remedies in Calandra, as opposed to cases such as
Mapp. In Calandra, although the violation was clear, the exclusionary rule was not the proper
remedy.
46. The Court's description of the rule is telling. The Court stated that "the rule is a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Id. at 348.
47. Id. at 347. The rule's "'purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.' Id.
at 347 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). This philosophical swing is
important because if the rule is only necessary as a means to deter, it may be discarded as other
more effective or less costly means are discovered. See supra note 36.
48. The term "framework" is borrowed from Thompson, 87 F.3d at 981 ("The Court's
'framework' for deciding whether the exclusionary rule applies in a particular civil proceeding
is to analyze whether the likely benefit of excluding illegally obtained evidence outweighs the
societal costs of exclusion."), however, the Supreme Court itself has referred to the
CalandralJanis balancing test as a 'Tramework." See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032, 1041 (1984) ("In United States v. Janis, ... this Court set forth a framework for deciding
in what types of proceeding application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate."). This
framework is a basic cost-benefit analysis and has been applied by federal courts in a wide
variety of contexts.
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of whether the rule should be applied in a given circumstance
depends on the "deterrent benefits" and the "social costs" of applying
the rule in that setting.49 This balancing test or framework has opened
the door to a series of holdings limiting the application of the
exclusionary rule.
B. Extension of Calandra by Federal Courts
This new framework, based on the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule, allowed the Court to sharply limit the scope of its
application. The Court has used the balancing framework described
in Calandra to reject the exclusionary rule and admit evidence seized
unconstitutionally in civil tax cases"0 and in deportation hearings.5 In
both of these instances, the Court held that the proper framework for
deciding whether the exclusionary rule applies in a particular civil
proceeding is to weigh the benefit of excluding illegally obtained
evidence against the societal costs of exclusion. 2
The Court's consistency has allowed lower courts to apply the
framework with confidence. Lower courts have used the framework
to cut back the exclusionary rule in other civil hearings. Among the
most recent of these cases is the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Thompson v. Carthage School District.53 In Thompson, the Eighth
Circuit held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to bar
the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence in civil school
49. The framework was given in terms of the immediate context:
"In deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh
the potential injury to the historic role and functions of the grand jury against the potential
benefits of the rule as applied in this context" Id. at 349; see also Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at
1041 ("[T]he Court recognized in Janis that there is no choice but to weigh the likely social
benefits of excluding unlawfully seized evidence against the likely costs.").
50. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
51. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
52. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040-1050 (applying the cost-benefit analysis to the
INS deportation context); Janis, 428 U.S. at 447-460 (considering whether the exclusionary rule
is a deterrent as a general proposition, and applying the Calandra cost-benefit analysis to grand
jury context).
53. 87 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 1996).
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disciplinary hearings.'
IV. THOMPSON V. CARTHAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT
A. District Court Found "Wrongful Expulsion"
School officials at Carthage High School expelled Ramone Lea
after finding crack cocaine in his pockets during a search for guns
and knives reported to be on school grounds.5  The district court 6
awarded $10,000 Lea in damages under section 1983 for "wrongful
expulsion" because the search had violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. Although the district court did not explicitly address the
question, its award of substantial damages for wrongful expulsion
was necessarily based on the proposition that Lea could not be
expelled on the basis of evidence discovered during an illegal search.
In short, the district court determined that the exclusionary rule was
applicable.58 Neither party raised the issue on appeal, but the Eighth
Circuit considered the exclusionary rule's applicability sua sponte.59
54. See id. at 982. The court's statement of its holding is very straightforward: "[W]e
conclude that the exclusionary rule may not be applied to prevent school officials from
disciplining students based upon the fruits of a search conducted on school grounds." Id. The
court did not mention that this was the exact issue the Supreme Court had left open in T.L.O.
See supra note 3.
55. See Thompson, 87 F.3d at 980. Carthage is a small, rural school district. Upon
suspicion that a student had a knife on a school bus, the school's principal decided to search all
male students in grades 6 through 12. During the search, students told the principal that a gun
was present at the school that day. Ramone Lea was a ninth grade student at Carthage. A search
of his pockets produced a used book of matches, a match box, and a cigarette package, which
were taken to the principal's office. The match box contained a white substance which tests
revealed to be crack cocaine. Following a hearing, Lea was expelled for the remainder of the
school year. See id.
56. Eastern District of Arkansas, Hon. Garnett T. Eisele, District Judge.
57. See Thompson, 87 F.3d at 980. The district court also granted Lea reasonable attorney
fees and a declaratory judgment that the search had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See
id,
58. This is another example showing that the substantive Fourth Amendment violation
issue is separate from the remedy. "Mhe district court awarded substantial damages for
wrongful expulsion, based entirely on the proposition that Lea could not be expelled for
possessing crack cocaine discovered during an illegal search." Id. at 981.
59. See id. "At the outset, we confront an issue ignored by the parties and the district
court-whether the Fourth Amendment is exclusionary rule applies in school disciplinary
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B. Eighth Circuit Applied Carthage Framework
After noting that the exclusionary rule is "judicially-created,"' the
court stated that the exclusionary rule has "never" been applied by
the Supreme Court to a civil proceeding.' The court cited the
Supreme Court's holdings in Janis and Lopez-Mendoza, which had
declined to apply the exclusionary rule. 2 The court then proceeded to
analyze the application of the rule to school disciplinary hearings,
using the "cost-benefit" framework announced in Calandra.63
1. Societal Costs of Exclusionary Rule
In applying the Calandra framework,6 the Eighth Circuit held
that the societal costs of applying the rule in school disciplinary
proceedings are very high. For example, the court felt that the
exclusionary rule might bar a high school from expelling a student
who confessed to killing a classmate on campus if the confession was
not preceded by Miranda warnings, and expressed doubt as to
whether "any parent would compromise school safety in this
fashion.,
65
proceedings. At oral argument, we invited counsel to submit supplemental briefs addressing this
issue, but neither side did so." Id.
60. The court opened its discussion with a definition of the "judicially-created"
exclusionary rule. This language is technically correct, and has been so since the Calandra
decision. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. However, its use foreshadowed the court's
eventual holding, insofar as the opponents of the rule have long championed this position. See
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
61. See Thompson, 87 F.3d at 981. "'In the complex and turbulent history of the rulc, the
Court has never applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state."' Id.
(quoting Janis, 428 U.S. at 447).
62. Both opinions consider the Calandra framework in declining to apply the
exclusionary rule as the remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment in specific contexts.
See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
63. The Calandra framework requires a determination of whether the likely benefit of
excluding illegally obtained evidence in a particular context outweighs the societal costs of
exclusion. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
64. The Eighth Circuit characterized the framework as requiring an analysis of "whether
the likely benefit of excluding illegally obtained evidence outweighs the societal costs of
exclusion." Thompson, 87 F.3d at 981 (citing Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041).
65. Id. at 981. This example seems a bit extreme. Use of the exclusionary rule as a remedy
imposes certain costs regardless of the context. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041
[Vol. 52:375
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More generally, the court stated that to the extent the exclusionary
rule prevents the disciplining of students who disrupt education or
endanger other students, it frustrates the critical governmental
function of educating and protecting children. Potential disruption of
this critical government function raises the "societal costs" side of the
balance and makes application of the exclusionary rule less likely.'
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit cited New Jersey v. T.L.O.,6 for the
proposition that "maintaining security and order in the schools
requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary
procedures."' s The court reasoned that application of the exclusionary
rule would require formal inquiries in the nature of suppression
hearings, which would be inconsistent with the required flexibility of
state officials involved in school discipline.69 Thus, application of the
exclusionary rule would take away this required flexibility, leaving
officials unable to respond to the demands of school discipline and
safety. This also raises the "societal costs" of the rule and lessens the
likelihood of its use under the cost-benefit framework.
2. Likely Benefit of the Exclusionary Rule
The Eighth Circuit then examined the likely benefits of imposing
the exclusionary rule in school disciplinary proceedings. The sole
benefit that the court considered was the rule's deterrent effect.7"
("On the cost side there is the loss of often probative evidence and all of the secondary costs
that flow from the less accurate or more cumbersome adjudication that therefore occurs."). The
Thompson court did not address these costs. See also supra note 11.
66. See Thompson, 87 F.3d at 981. This example seems to be right on target, and is
context-specific, as the fiamework requires.
67. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
68. Id. at 340. In T.L.O., the Supreme Court used this reasoning to find that no violation of
the Fourth Amendment had occurred. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-347. More recently, the
Supreme Court has applied similar reasoning to find that no violation of the Fourth Amendment
had occurred in Vernonia School District v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). Neither of these
cases addressed the exclusionary rule issue considered in Thompson.
69. The Eighth Circuit noted by way of analogy that the flexibility demands of school
discipline had led the Supreme Court to impose only very limited due process requirements in
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975). See also Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78
(1978).
70. See Thompson, 87 F.3d at 981. The court stated that "[t]he benefit of the exclusionary
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Attempting to weigh the deterrent effect, the court took note of the
fact that school officials both conducted the search and imposed the
student discipline." The court reasoned that "knowing that evidence
they illegally seize will be excluded at any subsequent disciplinary
proceeding would likely have a strong deterrent effect' 72 on school
officials. Thus, the court found that in this regard the case was similar
to Lopez-Mendoza.73 Although this factor is not dispositive, it cuts in
favor of a deterrent effect by increasing the "likely benefit" of
applying the exclusionary rule.74
However, the Thompson court went on to point out "important
differences between school discipline and the deportation proceeding
at issue in Lopez-Mendoza."' 5 The court analyzed these differences,
and concluded that they worked to lower the deterrent effect that
imposing the exclusionary rule in school disciplinary proceedings
would have on school officials. First, the court noted that school
officials are not law enforcement officers, and thus do not occupy a
role whose mission is closely analogous to that of police officers.76
The court opined that school officials distinct mission of school
officials lowers the deterrent effect of the rule's application to school
disciplinary proceedings.77
rule depends upon whether it would effectively deter Fourth Amendment violations." Id. This is
consistent with the Supreme Court's consideration of the framework. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. at 1041 (stating that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterring future
misconduct).
71. See Thompson, 87F.3dat981.
72. Id. (citing Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1042-43).
73. Seeidat981.
74. Indeed, the Lopez-Mendoza Court noted this fact, and its positive effect on the
potential deterrent value of the rule, but eventually decided against applying the exclusionary
rule. See id.
75. Id.
76. See id. The court considered this alternate role to be less susceptible to the rule's
deterrent effect. Specifically, the court stated: "School officials, on the other hand, are not law
enforcement officers. They do not have an adversarial relationship with students. 'Instead, there
is a commonality of interests between teachers and their pupils . I... d  (quoting T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring)).
77. See Thompson, 87 F.3d at 981-82.
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3. Other Considerations
The Thompson court also considered substantive Fourth
Amendment law in the school context.78 Noting that children have
limited expectations of privacy at school, the court reasoned that
although the Fourth Amendment did apply to searches by school
officials, the reasonableness standard as applied to school searches
falls short of probable cause.79 The opinion did not, however, explain
the link between the lower reasonableness standard and the lower
probability of benefits from the exclusionary rule.
The court's opinion concluded that, under the circumstances, there
was little need for the exclusionary rule and its possible deterrent
effect.80 In fact, the court stated that it saw some risk that the
exclusionary rule, if applied, would paradoxically deter educators
from undertaking disciplinary proceedings that are needed to keep the
schools safe."' The court further concluded that even if the
exclusionary rule did not have such a paradoxical effect, any
deterrence benefit would not begin to outweigh the high societal costs
of imposing the rule."82
C. Thompson and the School Context Precedent
1. Footnote One of Thompson
The Eighth Circuit did not explicitly base its holding on any
precedent applying the Calandra framework to the school
disciplinary setting. The court did imply, however, that its decision
was in line with virtually all the relevant case law. 3 In footnote one,
78. See id at 981.
79. See id. (citing TLO., 469 U.S. at 341).
80. See id.
81. See id. at 981-82. The court stated that it saw "some risk that application of the rule
would deter educators from undertaking disciplinary proceedings that are needed to keep the
schools safe and to control student misbehavior." Id.
82. Id. at 982.
83. See id. The court's opinion asserts that in declining to apply the exclusionary rule, its
holding is "like [that of] most district courts that have published opinions applying Janis and
Lopez-Mendoza...."Id.
1997]
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the Eighth Circuit cited four district courts that have published
opinions considering the application of the exclusionary rule to the
school disciplinary context.'
Specifically, the footnote includes James v. Unified School
District No. 512, 5 Morale v. Grigel,86 and Ekelund v. Secretary of
Commerce,87 which the court cited as consistent with its decision.
The court also referred to Jones v. Latexo Independent School
District," which the Thompson court cited as contrary to its
holding." The court's characterization of the available district court
precedent is open to some question, however, because the Thompson
decision represented more of a departure from precedent than its
opinion suggests.9"
2. Cases Declining to Apply the Exclusionary Rule
In James,9' the district court stated that the fruits of an
84. See Thompson, 87 F.3d at 982 n.l.
85. 899 F. Supp. 530, 533-34 (D. Kan. 1995).
86. 422 F. Supp. 988, 999-1001 (D.N.H. 1976).
87. 418 F. Supp. 102, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
88. 499 F. Supp. 223,238-39 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
89. See Thompson, 87 F.3d at 982 n.l.
90. Most commentators have not found the case law to be as uniform as the Eighth Circuit
suggests in Thompson. See, e.g., Kathleen K. Bach, Note, The Exclusionary Rule in the Public
School Administrative Disciplinary Proceeding: Answering the Question After New Jersey v..
T.L.O., 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1133, 1157 (1986).
Those commentators that have found the case law to point in a specific direction have
generally reached the opposite conclusion of Thompson. See, e.g., Charles W. Hardin, Jr.,
Comment Searching Public Schools: T.L.O. and the Exclusionary Rule, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 1099,
1108 (1986) ("An apparent majority of courts, by contrast, have adopted the position that the
exclusionary rule requires the suppression of evidence unlawfully seized from students by
school authorities"). See also id. at 1108 n.129 (citing Jones and Smyth as two well-written
opinions on the issue). The Thompson opinion lists Jones as contrary to its position and does
not refer to the Smyth case. See Thompson, 87 F.3d at 982 n.l.
91. 899 F. Supp. 530 (D. Kan. 1995). School officials received an anonymous tip that
James, a sophomore at Shawnee Mission Northwest High School, had a gun on school
premises. The following day, the school officials confronted James and searched his vehicle,
which was parked on school property. The parties disagreed as to whether James consented to
the search. Following notice and a hearing, he was expelled for the remainder of the school
year. See id.
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unconstitutional search may be used in school disciplinary hearings. 92
But the court did not rely on the cost-benefit framework in reaching
this decision.93 The Morale court's decision also was not based on the
cost-benefit framework. 94 By contrast, the stated rationale of the
Thompson case is based on the straightforward application of the
balancing framework. For these reasons, James and Morale shed very
little light on the issues involved in the Thompson case.
The third case relied on in the footnote, Ekelund,95 is also of very
little precedential value to Thompson. The district court in Ekelund
initially held that the search at issue was constitutional,96 and
appeared to rely on this determination in its abbreviated discussion of
the exclusionary rule. 7 The Ekelund analysis is also quite different
than the approach used in the Thompson decision, which considered
the issue quite separate from the constitutionality of the search and
resolved the issue independently. Thus, Ekelund provides little
92. See id at 533. The court clearly separated the violation from the remedy. "Assuming
the plaintiffs Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were violated, case law does not prohibit
using the fruits of that violation in school disciplinary hearings." Id.
93. See id at 532-33. The district court's rationale is not entirely clear. The Calandra
framework is discussed, but is never applied. See id. Additionally, the opinion relies on a
distinction used "prior to the Lopez-Mendoza decision," which turned on whether the civil
proceeding is "quasi-criminal." Id. at 533-34. Thus, the opinion is based on the proposition that
school disciplinary hearings are not quasi-criminal proceedings, an analysis that is not part of
the Calandra framework.
94. 422 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976). Morale is less similar on its facts to Thompson than
James. Morale was a student at a state technical institute, where he lived in the men's dorm. His
room was subjected to an unconstitutional search, which led to the discovery of marijuana in his
dorm room. Following a hearing, Morale was suspended for possession of marijuana. See id. at
992.
95. 418 F. Supp. 102 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Ekelund was a member of the U.S. Merchant
Marine Academy. His room was subjected to search, which resulted in the discovery of
marijuana. He was disciplined for the possession of the controlled substance. See id. at 103.
96. See id at 105. "The use in evidence of the product of the search of Ekelund's room
was not an invasion of his constitutional rights. . . .The search, therefore, was not an
unreasonable search and the seizure ... did not invade plaintiff Ekelund's constitutional rights."
Id.
97. See id. at 106. The court mentioned Janis, but did not apply the cost-benefit
framework. Instead the court appeared to rely on the fact that the expulsion was not criminal or
quasi-criminal, an inquiry not used since Lopez-Mendoza. The court stated that "[t]he
consequences of the proceeding are grave, but it is not a criminal proceeding, and in no true
sense is the proceeding punitive or vindictive, nor is it a forfeiture proceeding." Id. at 106.
1997]
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persuasive precedential support for Thompson.
3. Cases Applying Exclusionary Rule
The Eighth Circuit opinion also analyzed cases on the other side
of the equation. The Court listed the Jones s case as contrary to its
holding, but did not indicate that it was the only district court case it
cited that applied the Calandra framework to the school disciplinary
hearing context.99 Applying the framework, the Jones court reached
the opposite conclusion than the Thompson court and held that the
exclusionary rule was applicable to school disciplinary hearings.' 0
Additionally, the Jones court cited as persuasive Smyth v.
Lubbers,'°' a case comparable on its facts to Jones.'2 The Eighth
Circuit completely omitted Smyth from its list of district court cases
considering the exclusionary rule in school disciplinary hearings. 3
This omission is somewhat surprising, considering that the Smyth
98. 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980). The facts of Jones are more similar to the search at
issue in Thompson. In Jones, authorities used drug-sniffing dogs to find drugs on school
students and on-campus vehicles. The dogs were trained to detect the odor of marijuana and
other narcotics. The plaintiffs in Jones were students suspended from school for possession of
drug paraphernalia on campus as a result of the drug-dog search.
99. The Jones decision cites the cost-benefit framework from Janis and applies the factors
in relation to the school context. See id. at 238-39. None of the other cases cited in footnote I of
Thompson apply the framework or consider its peculiar application in the school context. See
supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
100. The Jones court weighed the deterrent effect and found that because the school
officials who suspended the plaintiffs on the basis of the unlawfully obtained evidence were the
very same individuals who planned and implemented the searches, "[e]xcluding the use of such
evidence from school disciplinary proceedings will directly and effectively deter
unconstitutional conduct by these officials, in the manner contemplated by the Supreme Court
in Mapp." Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 239.
101. 398 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Mich. 1975). The Smyth case involved a student residing in a
state dorm, subjected to a warrantless search. The search resulted in the discovery of marijuana
and disciplinary action on the basis of the seized evidence. See id. at 782-83.
102. See Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 238. "In a case comparable on its facts to this one.., the
Western District of Michigan refused to allow a state college to rely on the fruits of an unlawful
search ... to discipline those students occupying rooms where contraband was found." Id. The
rationale in both cases was explicitly based on deterrence: "If there were no exclusionary rule in
this case, [school] authorities would have no incentive to respect the privacy of students." Id
(quoting Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 794).
103. See Thompson, 87 F.3d at 982 n.1.
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case is one of only a handful of cases dealing directly with this issue.
Moreover, Smyth should have been readily apparent to the court as it
was cited by both Jones and Morale.3'4 The reason for the omission
may simply be that Smyth is contrary to the Eighth Circuit decision in
Thompson.'0 5
In short, a closer inspection shows that the district courts that have
applied the Calandra framework to the disciplinary hearing context
have not held the exclusionary rule inapplicable with the regularity
that Thompson suggests." 6 This fact should have been noted not only
because of lower federal court uncertainty on the issue but also
because of the intersection of the student rights at issue and the
qualified immunity doctrine.
D. Thompson, Precedent, and Qualifed Immunity
The Eighth Circuit should have acknowledged that the Thompson
decision was a greater departure from precedent than it suggested.' °7
This is especially important in light of the fact that no other Court of
Appeals had addressed this issue, and that the Supreme Court had
expressly left this issue open in T.L. 0.108 The district courts that have
addressed this issue have lacked uniformity of approach and
outcome. The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Thompson could help
104. See Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 237; Morale, 422 F. Supp. at 1001.
105. The Smyth case itself is not mysterious or difficult to find. Many commentators have
listed Smyth in string cites concerning the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Christine L. Andreoli,
Note, Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence in Subsequent Civil Proceedings: Focusing on
Motive to Determine Deterrence, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 1019, 1021 n.6 (citing Jones and Smyth
as holding evidence inadmissible in a high school and a college disciplinary hearing,
respectively, based on the Calandra framework). See also supra note 90 for other citations to
Smyth.
106. Commentators have not only differed with the Thompson court on its reading of the
case law, but most commentators have also argued that the exclusionary rule should apply to the
school disciplinary context in certain circumstances. See Ronald L. Vance, Comment, School
Search-The Supreme Court's Adoption of a "Reasonable Suspicion " Standard in New Jersey
v. T.L.O. and the Heightened Need for Extension of the Exclusionary Rule to School Search
Cases, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 274-81. See also supra note 90.
107. See supra notes 90, 83-105 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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rectify this problem." 9
Moreover, a clear acknowledgment that the Thompson decision is
a new development would be of great practical importance to school
officials in light of their qualified immunity."0 The current
formulation of the qualified immunity doctrine is wholly objective
and depends on the current state of the law."' Thus, school officials
are entitled to qualified immunity from suit for violations of students'
constitutional rights".2 if they do not violate clearly established law of
which a reasonable official would have known."3
The Thompson decision substantially clarifies the law regarding
the application of the exclusionary rule in school disciplinary
proceedings. The Eighth Circuit clearly held that the exclusionary
rule is not a proper remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in civil
school disciplinary hearings. In this respect, the opinion will be
welcomed by school administrators and officials.'"'
109. Seesupra note 90.
110. Qualified immunity is an "[a]ffirmative defense which shields public officials
performing discretionary functions from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
BLACK'S LAW DITIONARY 752 (6th ed. 1990).
111. The Supreme Court first established the qualified immunity doctrine in Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). Wood involved the due process rights of students in a school
disciplinary hearing. The Court held that school officials are immune from liability unless the
officials acted to violate rights of which they knew or should have known, or unless the officials
acted with malicious intent toward the students. See id. at 322.
For a history and application of qualified immunity, see Stephen J. Shapiro, Public
Officials' Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and its
Progeny: A CriticalAnalysis, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 249 (1989).
112. There are two avenues for such suits: suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and so-called
Bivens actions. Bivens actions are based on the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which allowed an implied private cause of
action based on violation of a constitutional right against federal officials. See also supra note
38.
113. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982) (holding that if the official's
conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known, the official may be held personally liable). Under this standard,
school officials are not immune when they knew or should have known that their actions would
violate a student's constitutional rights. See id.
114. The holding defines evidence that may properly be used in disciplinary proceedings.
Under Thompson, school officials in student disciplinary hearings can admit and consider
evidence which was seized in violation of the student's Fourth Amendment rights. As
Thompson makes clear, students have no right to exclude such evidence from their disciplinary
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The Thompson decision, however, substantially clarifies the law
with regard to remedies only, not the substantive protections of the
Fourth Amendment."' Thompson makes unconstitutionally seized
evidence admissible in school disciplinary hearings. This fact may
raise the concern that school officials will trample on the substantive
rights of students under the Fourth Amendment, knowing that even
evidence which is seized illegally can be admitted to suspend or
expel a student. Are such concerns legitimate? Or would such an
official lose his qualified immunity for such an intentional violation
of student rights?" 6 A full treatment of the qualified immunity
doctrine is beyond the scope of this Recent Development, but it is
clear that the Eighth Circuit's decision in Thompson has altered the
landscape with respect to these important constitutional issues.
CONCLUSION
The exclusionary rule bars the use of unconstitutionally seized
evidence against the person whose rights were violated by the search.
The rule, originally conceived as part of the constitutional right
against illegal searches and seizures, was later viewed as a mere
judicial construct designed to deter constitutional violations. Since
the adoption of this rationale, federal courts have reduced the scope
hearings. Hence, school officials are immune from suits challenging the admission of such
evidence on Constitutional due process grounds.
115. The Court in Thompson ultimately held that the underlying search was not a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. See supra notes 57-59. However, that ruling was secondary to the
court's independent conclusion that the exclusionary rule should not be applied. This Recent
Development has focused on Thompson's primary importance, its holding regarding the
exclusionary rule. See supra notes 8, 17-18, 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing the
distinction between violations of Fourth Amendment Rights and the proper remedy for such a
violation).
116. Under the current formulation of the qualified immunity doctrine, it appears that the
school official's subjective intent to violate the student's rights might be irrelevant.
Commentators have noted that the current objective test is a pure legal question. See, e.g., Linda
Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467, 1502 (1996) ("Qualified
immunity determinations, like Rule 11 determinations, focus on the determinacy or
indeterminacy of the law, not the defendants' states of mind."). The rationale for this view of
qualified immunity is to allow the determinations to be made by judges at the summary
judgment stage, rather than involving difficult factual issues of state of mind. See id.
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of the exclusionary rule. The Eighth Circuit's recent decision in
Thompson v. Carthage School District represents a continuation of
this trend.
The Thompson decision, holding that the exclusionary rule should
not be applied to exclude evidence in civil school disciplinary
hearings, is a straightforward application of the Supreme Court's
framework in Calandra. Thompson, however, represents a different
approach, and a different outcome, from much of the existing district
court cases that have considered the issue.
Indeed, the result is a greater break from precedent and
commentary than the Eighth Circuit acknowledged in its opinion.
This is an important observation, in light of the intersection between
the constitutional rights of students and the doctrine of qualified
immunity for school officials. Thompson allows school officials to
discipline a student on the basis of evidence that has been seized in
violation of the student's rights. Under Thompson such action is now
protected by the qualified immunity. But Thompson could raise some
important questions of qualified immunity for intentional violations
of student's substantive Fourth Amendment rights.
D. Shane Jones*
J.D. 1997, Washington University.
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